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Abstract
By applying a technique previously developed to study ecosystem assembly [Capita´n et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 168101
(2009)] we study the evolutionary stable strategies of iterated 2|2 games. We focus on memory-one strategies, whose
probability to play a given action depends on the actions of both players in the previous time step. We find the
asymptotically stable populations resulting from all possible invasions of any known stable population. The results of this
invasion process are interpreted as transitions between different populations that occur with a certain probability. Thus the
whole process can be described as a Markov chain whose states are the different stable populations. With this approach we
are able to study the whole space of symmetric 2|2 games, characterizing the most probable results of evolution for the
different classes of games. Our analysis includes quasi-stationary mixed equilibria that are relevant as very long-lived
metastable states and is compared to the predictions of a fixation probability analysis. We confirm earlier results on the
success of the Pavlov strategy in a wide range of parameters for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, but find that as the
temptation to defect grows there are many other possible successful strategies. Other regions of the diagram reflect the
equilibria structure of the underlying one-shot game, albeit often some non-expected strategies arise as well. We thus
provide a thorough analysis of iterated 2|2 games from which we are able to extract some general conclusions. Our most
relevant finding is that a great deal of the payoff parameter range can still be understood by focusing on win-stay, lose-shift
strategies, and that very ambitious ones, aspiring to obtaining always a high payoff, are never evolutionary stable.
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Introduction
Cooperation has been reported at practically every level of
biological organization [1] and, in fact, it has been argued to play
a key role in the major steps of evolution [2]. In spite of its
widespread presence, cooperation faces a central problem, namely
the vulnerability of cooperators to being exploited by selfish
partners, as realized already by Darwin [3]. The need for a
sophisticated, subtle explanation of cooperation was recognized
early on by Hamilton [4,5] and Trivers [6], who based their
theories of cooperation on genetic relatedness (kin selection) and
on the logic of repeated interactions (reciprocal altruism or direct
reciprocity), respectively. Subsequently, other theories have been
put forward as possible explanations for the appearance and
emergence of cooperation [7] with different degrees of success and
applicability.
Among the theories of cooperation, direct reciprocity has
received a lot of attention, in particular from the theoretical
viewpoint. The reason for this is twofold: on the one hand, as
Dugatkin [8] puts it, reciprocity is a type of cooperation that is far
from trivial to explain and, being such a hard challenge, it requires
more work. On the other hand, albeit rare in most other social
animals [9] including primates [10,11], reciprocity is one of the
most important forms of human cooperation [1,12], probably
since almost two million years ago [13,14], as reciprocity appears
to be an unavoidable consequence of small group size, given the
cognitive abilities of humans [15]. Thus, direct reciprocity has
been studied by many authors, starting from the original proposal
by Trivers [6], relevant contributions including Refs. [16–25].
Practically all these works deal with the Prisoner’s Dilemma [26]
as the paradigm through which the discussion takes place (for a
recent summary, see chapter 3 in [27]).
The large amount of research done on the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma has allowed to reach some important conclusions. Thus,
the famous computer tournaments organized by Axelrod [12]
showed that a simple strategy, tit-for-tat (TFT), in which players
started cooperating and then repeated the opponent’s previous
action, was the most successful among those submitted to play the
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Subsequent works pointed out the
relevance of a less vengeful version, generous TFT [28] and,
furthermore, that TFT could be outperformed by Pavlov, a win-
stay, lose-shift type of strategy [20]. In order to systematize these
findings, it was proposed [29,30] to consider finite automata as
players. This approach was later improved upon by including
noise (errors in performing an action or in perceiving the
opponent’s action) [31,32]. The basic idea behind those studies
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is to consider all possible sets of strategies defined in terms of their
action following all possibilities of actions by the focus player and
her opponent (memory-one strategies). Noise is included by
allowing errors in the implementation of the action with a small
probability. Then, starting from a given initial population,
strategies face each other and reproduce according to their
performance, possibly with mutation. With this dynamics,
complicated (chaotic) trajectories as well as cycles involving a
number of strategies–such as AllD (always defect), GRIM (always
defect after the first defection by the opponent), TFT, Pavlov, and
others–can be observed. However, as Sigmund [27] puts it, it is
hard to sort out, among the many possible strategies, which one
would be selected by evolution; indeed, individual based
simulations display particular contingencies and few robust
predictions. On the other hand, other games can be used as
paradigms for the emergence of cooperation and, in fact, Nowak
et al. [32] considered the Hawk-Dove or Snowdrift game [33],
showing that Pavlov played an important role in it as well.
In this paper, we elaborate on the above discussed issues by
benefiting from a completely different approach, recently
developed in the context of the emergence and robustness of
ecosystems [34–36]. Roughly speaking, the idea is to look at the
stability of populations of strategies by attempting to invade them
with all the other available ones, and then repeat the procedure
with the resulting stable populations, and so on and so forth until
one has identified all the stable ‘‘ecosystems’’, i.e., all the stable
composition of populations. With this procedure, one can compute
the probabilities of transition between those stable populations and
treat the system as a Markov chain whose states are the stable
populations. Subsequently, the theory of Markov chains allows one
to identify what are the absorbing and/or recurrent sets and hence
the relevant population compositions. The advantage of this
method is that it systematically explores all possible compositions
instead of relying on random mutations to drive the evolution of
the system toward the evolutionary relevant ones. In addition, by
means of this technique, we have been able to explore not only the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game but all the possible symmetric 2|2
games, thus widening enormously our knowledge of the effects of
direct reciprocity on the different forms of possible human
interactions and social dilemmas [37].
Our results and conclusions will be presented according to the
following scheme. In ‘Methods’ we introduce our model and detail
our approach to the problem, describing in depth the procedure
we are adapting from studies of ecosystem assembly and also an
alternative analysis using fixation probabilities. We also explain
how to implement the approach in practical terms by using an
acceleration procedure, and the manner in which the relevant
results are obtained in terms of the parameters characterizing
them, the most important one being the structure of the invasion
graph in terms of absorbing and recurrent sets. Our results are
collected and explained in the ‘Results’ section, where we analyze
all the parameter space of symmetric 2|2 games, identify the
strategies appearing in the relevant equilibria and discuss the
evolutionary reasons for the composition of those equilibria.
Finally, section ‘Discussion’ concludes the paper by summarizing
our main results and their implications.
Methods
Model
We will consider well-mixed populations in which individuals
interact in pairs with a randomly chosen opponent. Whenever two
players engage in one such interaction they play an iterated two-
strategy game. Each round of this game players can choose among
two possible actions, that we generically term C (for cooperate)
and D (for defect). If a player plays C she receives R if the
opponent also plays C and S if the opponent plays D; if she plays
D instead, she receives T if the opponent plays C and P if the
opponent also plays D. The payoff obtained by each player is
added to her accumulated payoff so far, and a new round of the
game takes place with probability r.
The game thus described will last exactly n~1,2, . . . rounds
with probability rn{1(1{r), so the expected number of rounds is
E(n)~(1{r){1. On the other hand, if W (n) is the payoff
collected by a given player in round n, the expected payoff will be
W (r)~
X?
n~1
(1{r)rn{1
Xn
k~1
W (k)
~
X?
k~1
W (k)(1{r)
X?
n~k
rn{1~
X?
k~1
W (k)rk{1:
ð1Þ
Payoffs are to be compared with each other, so that rescaling them
all by the same factor is immaterial. Thus it is convenient to
introduce the expected averaged payoff dividing by E(n), i.e.,
w(r)~(1{r)W (r)~(1{r)
X?
k~1
W (k)rk{1: ð2Þ
With this definition we can even study the limit r?1{, for then,
applying a theorem of Frobenius [27],
w~ lim
r?1{
w(r)~ lim
n??
1
n
Xn
k~1
W (k) ð3Þ
coincides with the average payoff of an infinitively long run of
iterations. For simplicity we will henceforth only consider this
limit.
Without loss of generality we can set one of the entries of the
2|2 payoff matrix to 0 (setting the origin of payoffs) and another
one to 1 (scaling payoffs by one of them). A common
normalization is R~1 and P~0 [28,38]. With this choice Tw1
becomes a temptation to defect and Sv0 involves a risk in
cooperating. With the combination of this two tensions we can
parametrize different social dilemmas represented by the Harmo-
ny game (no tensions), the Stag Hunt game (risk in cooperating),
the Snowdrift or Hawk-Dove game (temptation to defect), or the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (both tensions).
Strategies
The available set of strategies for a player involved in an iterated
game is virtually infinite, so for practical purposes we must impose
strong constraints to the players’ behavior that select a finite–
hopefully small–number of strategies out of this set. In modeling
direct reciprocity memory is an important ingredient, so we will
focus on strategies that take into account the past history of the
iterated game against the same opponent. It is reasonable to
assume that players have a limited ability to remember past
actions, so we will focus on strategies that depend only on a fixed
number of past rounds. Among them, the simplest and most
studied are memory-one strategies [27]. These are the only ones
we will be dealing with in this article.
Memory-one strategies are characterized by four parameters,
namely the four probabilities of cooperating in the current round,
given that the focal player played X and the opponent played Y in
the previous round (X,Y[fC,Dg). We will denote this probabilities
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pR, pS , pT , and pP, where the subscripts denote the payoffs when
the pair XY is CC (R), CD (S), DC (T ), and DD (P). Each of these
probabilities is in the interval (0,1), excluding both zero and one
because some strategies having these extreme probabilities (e.g.,
TFT) are unstable against errors [20,27,32].
Memory-one strategies with error still form an infinite set of
strategies–namely the hypercube (0,1)4. Simulations, though,
indicate that interactions are dominated by extreme strategies
[20], i.e., those for which probabilities are either E or 1{E, with E
denoting the probability of making a mistake in choosing the
action (with notable exceptions like generous TFT). Accordingly
we will limit our study to only this kind of strategies, taking
E~0:01. The results did not show qualitative differences when
higher values of E were taken. Thus we are left with a set of 16
strategies, each characterized by a binary vector (bR,bS,bT ,bP) in
which bi~0 if pi~E and bi~1 if pi~1{E.
Payoff matrix
In order to obtain the 16|16 payoff matrix of this game we
need to determine the stationary probability with which the four
states (CC, CD, DC, and DD) occur. The interaction between two
players forms a four-state Markov chain whose transition
probability matrix–denoted M(s,s’)–is given by [27]
pRp’R pR(1{p’R) (1{pR)p’R (1{pR)(1{p’R)
pSp’T pS(1{p’T ) (1{pS)p’T (1{pS)(1{p’T )
pTp’S pT (1{p’S) (1{pT )p’S (1{pT )(1{p’S)
pPp’P pP(1{p’P) (1{pP)p’P (1{pP)(1{p’P)
0
BBB@
1
CCCA, ð4Þ
where s and s’ are shorthands for the four-number codes of the
strategies of the focal player and her opponent, respectively–whose
probabilities are distinguished with a prime. The steady state is
described by the left eigenvector p(s,s’)~p(s,s’)M(s,s’), in
terms of whose components the average payoff of the focal player
when confronted against her opponent will be
W (s,s’)~pR(s,s’)RzpS(s,s’)SzpT (s,s’)TzpP(s,s’)P: ð5Þ
This defines the element (s,s’) of the payoff matrix.
Invasion dynamics
We will consider that players may spontaneously change their
strategies and adopt any other one. These ‘‘mutations’’–especially
if they occur often–are a source of heterogeneity in populations. In
the limit when this mutation rate is very small any change of
strategy can be regarded as an attempt of a new strategy to invade
a resident population. Given that there are only 16 different
strategies such invasion attempts can be systematically studied
using a method recently introduced in the context of ecological
community assembly [34–36].
The idea is to construct an invasion graph as follows. We start
off from 16 homogeneous populations, each with a different
strategy. Every one of these initial states is represented with a node
of the invasion graph. Now we invade each of these homogeneous
populations with everyone of the 15 remaining strategies (invasions
are assumed to occur at a very small fraction of the total
population). The dynamics leads the system to one of the following
states: (a) back to the original homogeneous population, (b) to a
homogeneous population of the mutant strategy, or (c) to a mixed
equilibrium of both strategies. In case (a) nothing is added to the
invasion graph; in case (b) a directed link is established from the
node corresponding to the original population to the node
corresponding to the final population (the link is labeled with
the invading strategy); in case (c) a new node is added to the graph
representing the new mixed equilibrium and a labeled, directed
link goes from the original population to this new node. When
every one of the original 16 nodes has been invaded with every
one of the other 15 strategies, we focus in the added nodes (mixed
equilibria) and try to invade them with each of the remaining 14
other strategies. Again links are created from these nodes to the
nodes the invasion leads to, and new nodes are added to the graph
for every new equilibrium found after the invasion. We proceed in
this way until no new nodes can be added through invasions.
We have not specified the population dynamics yet. In principle,
given the payoff matrix (5), an imitation dynamics can be
implemented through the replicator equation [39] under the
assumption that populations are infinitely large. Nowak et al. [32]
analyzed the replicator dynamics for this kind of strategies. The
results show that, as the number of strategies in the population
increase, the probability that the population gets engaged in a
cycle or a strange attractor increases as well. Our own calculations
confirm this fact. The problem with cyclic dynamics is that orbits
are structurally unstable, and their very existence is a direct
consequence of the infinite population limit under which the
replicator dynamics makes sense. Sampling noise introduced by
small populations destroys the orbits.
For the above reason, we have chosen a discrete imitation
dynamic in a large (albeit finite) population, which we have set to
N~1000 individuals. According to this dynamics two individuals
are selected at random from the population; if DW denotes the
excess payoff obtained by the opponent compared to that of the
focal players, then the latter replaces her strategy by that of the
former with probability
p~
1
2
1z
DW
w
 
, ð6Þ
w being the largest possible payoff difference. This probability is
1=2 if there is no payoff difference (DW~0, corresponding to
random drift) and larger (smaller) than 1=2 if DWw0 (DWv0).
There are other alternative stochastic dynamics that can be
implemented [38] and the results may depend on this specific
choice. The main reason to choose this one is that it becomes
equivalent to the replicator dynamics in the limit N??.
However, even a proportional update like this one could have
been implemented in a different way, for instance setting
p~DW=w if DWw0 and p~0 otherwise. The reason to prefer
(6) to the latter is that for DW~0 it correctly captures random
drift, and thus complies better with the behavior one observes in
real systems.
Fixation processes
A discrete dynamics like the one we are considering here always
leads to an asymptotically homogeneous population. Since only
mutations (invasions) can introduce new strategies, a homogeneous
population is always an absorbing state. Nevertheless, we are going
to consider mixed equilibria as well. The rationale for this is that
these (unarguably) metastable states have an absorption time into a
homogeneous population that grows exponentially with N, so that
the absorbing states becomes virtually unreachable. The existence
of these states can be rigorously formalized using the quasi-
stationarity concept of Markov chains [40]–although we will not
follow such a rigorous approach here, but content ourselves with a
practical implementation of it focusing on non-absorbed realiza-
tions of the process.
Generosity Pays in Direct Reciprocity
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To support our argument, let us calculate the probabilities of
the different invasions as fixation probabilities, i.e. the probability
that a single invader will eventually be imitated by all the rest of
individuals, who play the resident strategy. This probability is
given by [27,41]
Pf ix~
1
1z
PN{1
j~1 P
j
k~1 pk,k{1=pk,kz1
, ð7Þ
where pk,kz1 is the probability that an individual of the resident
strategy imitates a mutant one (birth) and pk,k{1 is the probability
that an individual of the mutant strategy imitates a resident one
(death). These probabilities are obtained from the imitation
probability (6).
An easy to obtain lower bound to the mean time to fixation is
[41]
XN{1
j~2
pj,jz1 P
j{1
k~1
pk,kz1
pk,k{1
: ð8Þ
The signature of the formation of a metastable mixed equilibrium
is that the expected time to fixation becomes extremely large, so
much that actually observing fixation in a normal realization of the
process is very unlikely. We have checked that is what happens
(with fixation times of the mutant strategy higher than 1015) in
those invasion processes for which realizations lead to a mixed
equilibrium. Therefore the invasion processes cannot be realisti-
cally studied by fixation probabilities because mixed equilibria
would be completely missed. In any event, and for the sake of
completeness, we will compare the results that come from the
study of the fixation probabilities with those which come from
simulations. This will clearly show the actual importance of
allowing mixed states in the different games.
Acceleration of simulations
The invasion process with the above described discrete
dynamics has been studied by simulations. Every invasion process
amounted to replace 1% of the resident population by individuals
with the invading strategy. For every resident population and any
invading strategy we have carried out 100 realizations of the
process. If part of these realizations ended up in a certain
equilibrium, a link was added to the graph going from the node
corresponding to the resident population to the node correspond-
ing to the new equilibrium. This link is weighted with the fraction
of the 100 realizations that led to it.
If implemented like that, the process becomes very slow when
the probability of selecting from the population two different
individuals is very small. In order to solve this problem, we have
introduced an accelerated process which avoids all steps in which
two identical individual are selected and thus the process remains
frozen. To that end, let us note that the probability that in a given
step of the Markov process an individual using strategy i is
replaced by another with strategy j=i if there are nk individuals
using strategy k in the population (k~1, . . . ,s, with s the number
of different strategies) is, according to (6),
Pr (i?j)~
1
2
1z
Wj{Wi
w
 
ninj
N(N{1)
: ð9Þ
Therefore there will be a change in the composition of the
population with probability
Pr (Dn=0)~
Ps
i,j~1
j=i
Pr (i?j)~ 1
2N(N{1)
Ps
i,j~1
j=i
ninjz
1
w
Ps
i,j~1
j=i
(Wj{Wi)ninj
8><
>:
9>=
>;: ð10Þ
Here n~(n1, . . . ,ns) denotes the population vector and Dn its
change after one time step. But
Xs
i,j~1
j=i
(Wj{Wi)ninj~
Xs
i,j~1
(Wj{Wi)ninj~0,
and since
P
j=i nj~N{ni,
Xs
i,j~1
j=i
ninj~
Xs
i~1
ni(N{ni)~N
2{
Xs
i~1
n2i :
Therefore
Pr (Dn=0)~
N2{
P
i
n2i
2N(N{1)
: ð11Þ
This, together with Eq. (9), yield the probability that i is replaced
by j=i in one time step conditioned on there being a change in the
composition of the population, namely
Pr (i?jD n=0)~ 1z
Wj{Wi
w
 
ninj
N2{
P
k
n2k
: ð12Þ
Using this new process directly is not practical, but we can
replace it by a simpler one if we decompose
Pr (i?jD n=0)~P(jDi)P(i), ð13Þ
where
P(i)~
ni N{nizw
{1N(W{Wi)
h i
N2{
P
k
n2k
, ð14Þ
P(jDi)~
nj 1zw
{1(Wj{Wi)
h i
N{nizw
{1N(W{Wi)
, if i=j,
0 if i~j,
0
B@ ð15Þ
denoting W:N{1
P
k Wknk. It is straightforward to check that
Xs
i~1
P(i)~1,
Xs
j~1
P(jDi)~1, i~1, . . . ,s,
so that P(i) and P(jDi) are genuine probabilities. The advantage of
this trick is that the accelerated process can be implemented by
selecting individuals with strategy i according to the probability
distribution P(i) and replacing their strategy with j=i according to
P(jDi).
(1 )
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The original process can be recovered from the accelerated one
if between every two contiguous steps of the latter we insert an
exponential process with probability Pr (Dn~0) (complementary
to (11)). The life expectancy of this process is
t(n)~
Pr (Dn~0)
Pr (Dn=0)
z1~
1
Pr (Dn=0)
, ð16Þ
which is finite as long as the population is heterogeneous.
Thus, given a realization of the accelerated process in which the
sequence of compositions is fnagta~1, we can estimate the average
of a given observable A(n) as
SAT~t{1
Xt
a~1
A(na)t(na), t~
Xt
a~1
t(na): ð17Þ
Simulations are run until the average composition SniT remains
constant (plus or minus 10 individuals) for an average time t&106.
Markov chain for the invasion graph
The resulting invasion graph for a given pair of values (S,T) has
an associated Markov chain. If qij denotes the fraction of invasions
that lead the resident community of node i to the new community
j=i and j(%1) denotes the invasion (or mutation) rate, then
matrix P~IzjQ, where the diagonal of Q~(qij) is defined so
that
P
j qij~0, is the transition probability matrix of the Markov
chain associated to the invasion graph.
From the theory of Markov chains we know that a permutation
of indexes yields the form [41]
~Q~
U 0
W V
 
, U~
U1 0    0
0 U2    0
..
. ..
. P ...
0 0    Ur
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA, ð18Þ
for matrix Q. The set of nodes (denoted T ) corresponding to sub-
matrix V are transient nodes; the remaining ones are recurrent
nodes. The latter are subsequently divided into independent
disjoint sets, each of which is formed by the nodes involved in each
one of the matrices Um, m~1, . . . ,r (denote with Rm the
corresponding set).
The probability aim that the Markov chain ultimately enters the
set Rm if it started off from node i[T is determined as
aim~
X
j[T
Vijajmz
X
j[Rm
Wij : ð19Þ
Defining matrices A:(aim) and Z:(
P
j[mWij), this equation can
be written as
A~(I{V ){1Z: ð20Þ
The value
Figure 1. Composition of the recurrent sets for each studied game. The centers of the squares correspond to the pairs (S,T) that define
those games. Each strategy is assigned a different color (color code in the separate column on the right). Within each square there may be one or
more pie charts. Each of them represents a different recurrent set. The sizes of the pies are proportional to the average probabilities of reaching them
from the transient states (am). Pie sectors separated with thick lines correspond to different nodes of the recurrent set. Their sizes are proportional to
their probabilities in the stationary state (given by the components of the vectors sm). If a sector is of one color it means that the node corresponds a
pure strategy; if it is subdivided in smaller sectors with different colors it means that the node corresponds to a mixed strategy, the different colors
representing the coexisting strategies. The sizes of these sub-sectors are proportional to their fraction within the mixed strategy.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035135.g001
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am~
1
DT D
X
i[T
aim ð21Þ
is the average of these probabilities over all transient nodes.
On the other hand, if the Markov chain ends up in set Rm, the
asymptotic probability distribution it reaches on the nodes of Rm is
given by the vector sm, determined as smUm~0.
Results
Quasi-stationary invasion process
Following the construction of our model and the corresponding
approach to find all its quasi-stationary configurations (as discussed
in ‘Methods’) we have studied by simulation the whole parameter
space of symmetric 2|2 games as given by representative points
for different regions. For each pair of values for the payoffs S and
T , we will describe the asymptotic behavior of the population by
giving the probabilities with which the different nodes of the
recurrent set m are visited, sm, as well as the probabilities (if there is
more than one recurrent set) am to reach each of them. These data
are summarized in a pictorial way in Fig. 1. For those readers
interested in the quantitative composition of the equilibria and
detailed listing of all the strategies present, we have collected all the
information as tables, one for each one of the four quadrants of the
(S,T) plane, available in Tables 1–4.
Figure 1 represents the asymptotic states of the invasion process
with pie charts. There is one such diagram for every recurrent set
of the Markov chain of the invasion process, and their respective
sizes are proportional to the probabilities of ending up in each of
them. If a recurrent set is made of different states, each one is
assigned a sector of the pie, with an angle proportional to the
stationary probability of the Markov chain. Colors code for
strategies. If a state corresponds to a homogeneous population
(hence a true stationary state of an invasion process) then its sector
will have the color that corresponds to its strategy. If the state is a
mixed equilibrium (hence a quasi-stationary, or metastable, state
of an invasion process) then the sector is subdivided in colored sub-
sectors, each of a size proportional to the population share that the
corresponding strategy has.
At first glance, Fig. 1 seems very complicated, but after a more
careful study patterns begin to appear, corresponding to the
different types of games and a few additional, well defined
parameter regions that we will introduce below. To interpret it
and understand the origin of the results, it is important to identify
the four main classes of games: beginning with the upper left
corner and proceeding in clockwise order, the four quadrants (we
will call them quadrants even if the T axis is centered around
T~1 and not T~0) correspond to Harmony, Snowdrift,
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt. On the other hand, previous
works pointed out the importance of the WSLS strategies [31,32].
These strategies are defined in the following way: an individual
Table 1. Recurrent sets found in the Snowdrift game quadrant.
S T strategies in recurrent set sm am
0:25 1:25 1001 1 1
0:5 1:5 1001 1 0.70
1001 1 0.30
0:5 2:0 (0:13)0010 (0:22)0011 (0:65)1011 1 1
0:5 2:5 (0:19)0010 (0:27)0011 (0:54)1011 1 1
0:75 1:75 (0:88)0100 (0:12)0101 1 0.57
(0:13)0010 (0:21)0011 (0:63)1011 1 0.43
1:0 2:0 (0:80)0100 (0:20)0101 1 0.69
(0:18)0010 (0:27)0011 (0:55)1011 1 0.31
1:0 1:5 (0:62)0100 (0:38)0101 0.58 0.73
(0:55)0100 (0:33)0101 (0:12)1101 0.40
(0:58)0100 (0:35)0101 (0:07)1111 0.02
(0:13)0010 (0:21)0011 (0:67)1011 1 0.27
1:25 1:75 (0:49)0100 (0:33)0101 (0:18)1101 1 0.80
(0:18)0010 (0:27)0011 (0:55)1011 1 0.20
1:5 2:5 (0:71)0100 (0:29)0101 0.99 0.74
(0:67)0100 (0:27)0101 (0:66)1101 0.01
(0:23)0010 (0:30)0011 (0:47)1011 1 0.26
1:5 1:5 (0:18)0100 (0:26)0101 (0:56)1101 1 0.72
(0:18)0010 (0:26)0011 (0:56)1011 1 0.22
(0:21)0111 (0:46)1011 (0:33)1110 1 0.06
1:75 1:25 1101 1 0.73
(0:17)0010 (0:26)0011 (0:57)1011 1 0.27
Recurrent sets found for every pair (S,T) in the Snowdrift game quadrant (Sw0, Tw1). Different boxes for the same pair of S,T values denote different recurrent sets.
The four digits denote the strategies present in the corresponding set. The notation (x)a (y)b . . . denotes mixed equilibria in which strategies a,b, . . . enter with fractions
x,y, . . . respectively. For each strategy the probability to find it in the recurrent set is given in column sm . Also listed is the average probability with which the different
recurrent sets are reached (column am).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035135.t001
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who follows a WSLS strategy opts by the same action that carried
out in the previous round if and only if she obtained a payoff
higher than her aspiration level. Since there are four possible
payoffs, there are three possible aspiration levels (disregarding
aspirations levels higher than the highest or lower than the lowest
possible payoffs). A consequence of the changes in the ordering of
payoffs in different regions of the diagram is that the strategies
belonging to the WSLS category change along the diagram. In
order to make it easier for the reader to follow our discussion, we
have included an additional plot, Fig. 2, where we summarize the
payoffs and WSLS strategies sorted by aspiration level for every
parameter region we are studying. Following [32], we will call
ambitious the WSLS strategy that is only happy with the highest
possible payoff, balanced the one that is content with the two highest
ones, and modest the strategy that only intends to avoid the lowest
possible payoff. As an example, for the typical region of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (1ƒTƒ2, {1ƒSƒ0) 0001 is ambitious,
1001 is balanced (this is the original Pavlov strategy as identified in
[31]) and 1000 is modest.
A striking feature of Fig. 1 worth mentioning is the existence of
games with more than one recurrent set. The meaning of this is
that the end state for these games is contingent on the initial state
of the population and the particular history of invasions that has
occurred. The relative probabilities of reaching one or another of
these recurrent sets reflect the number of histories that end up in
each of them. But no matter how small this probability is, once the
population reaches one of these end states, it is uninvadable.
Let us begin the presentation of our results by the region
SzTv2 of the (S,T) plane, i.e., the part of the diagram below
the dot-dashed line in Fig. 1. Generally speaking, except for very
high temptation values in the Prisoner’s Dilemma quadrant, in this
region we only find recurrent sets consisting of a single type of
strategy (except for the game with S~0:5, T~1, at the border
between Harmony and Snowdrift, for which there is a second
small recurrent set where 0100 and 0101 coexist in a mixed
strategy). In agreement with previous research, for the strict
Prisoner’s Dilemma game with not so large temptation values, the
unique absorbing node turns out to be the balanced WSLS
strategy (Pavlov, 1001). An example of this result can be seen for
the parameters (S,T)~({0:5,1:5), where a blue large dot
represents the absorbing set formed only by Pavlov. The same
happens for the (S,T)~(0,1) point, but starting from there and as
one enters further in the Harmony game quadrant, there is a
smooth transition in which an additional absorbing set appears,
corresponding to the strategy AllC (1111), the balanced WSLS in
this region above the S~T line (dashed in Fig. 1; see also Fig. 2).
In fact, above that line the equilibrium configuration is practically
always AllC, with a residual presence of Pavlov in a few points.
Therefore, our first result can be phrased by saying that balanced
WSLS strategies represent the equilibrium configurations of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (for not so large temptations, specifically
Tv2) and the Harmony games.
The above conclusion applies in general to the region
comprised between SzT~0 (dotted line in Fig. 1) and
SzT~2, but things are not so simple when one looks at the
part of this region that belongs to the Stag Hunt. The Stag Hunt
quadrant is abundant in games with history-contingent end states.
This is not surprising because in Stag Hunt coordinating pays, and
coordination can be achieved by several different strategies–
among them AllC (1111) and Pavlov (1001), the two strategies that
are exchanging the role of balanced WSLS. However we also see
Table 2. Recurrent sets found in the Harmony game
quadrant.
S T strategies in recurrent set sm am
1:5 {0:5 1111 1 1
1:5 0:5 1111 1 1
1:25 0:25 1111 1 1
1:0 0 1111 1 1
1:0 1:0 1111 1 1
0:75 {0:25 1111 1 0.91
1001 1 0.09
0:75 0:25 1111 1 0.88
1001 1 0.12
0:5 {0:5 1111 1 0.86
1001 1 0.09
0:5 0:5 1111 1 0.78
1001 1 0.22
1111 1 0.85
0:25 {0:75 1001 1 0.12
0001 1 0.03
1111 1 0.54
0:25 0:75 1001 1 0.37
0001 1 0.09
0:5 1:0 1001 1 0.73
(0:75)0100 (0:25)0101 1 0.27
0:5 1:0 (0:11)0010 (0:20)0011 (0:69)1011 1 1
Same as Table 1 for the Harmony game quadrant (Sw0, Tƒ1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035135.t002
Table 3. Recurrent sets found in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game quadrant.
S T strategies in recurrent set sm am
0 1:0 1001 1 1
0 1:5 1001 1 1
{0:5 1:0 1001 1 1
{0:5 1:5 1001 1 1
{1:5 1:5 1001 1 1
0 2:5 (0:14)0010 (0:22)0011 (0:64)1011 1 1
0 2:0 0000 0.34 1
1001 0.10
1011 0.10
all others except 06 0.46
{0:5 2:5 0000 0.19 1
1000 0.43
all others except 06 0.43
{0:5 2:0 0000 0.20 1
1000 0.49
all others except 06 0.31
{1:5 2:5 0000 0.24 1
1000 0.62
all 0.14
Same as Table 1 for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game quadrant (Sƒ0, T§1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035135.t003
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evidence for 0001 becoming a new absorbing state, albeit in a
smaller –but noticeable–proportion than AllC and Pavlov. The
reason why the strategy 0001 appears in the Stag Hunt quadrant is
because it does coordinate with itself (like the other two), although
in this case it oscillates every step between CC and DD. The
presence of this strategy supports the conclusions of [42], where it
was pointed out that WSLS strategies are not efficient in some of
these games (we will see below that this is also the case in the
remaining region of the Snowdrift game).
Let us now move to other regions of the (S,T) plane; in
particular, let us consider the parameter set limited by SzTƒ2
and T§2, which belongs to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Here we find
that the successful strategy is not Pavlov anymore but, instead,
equilibria are almost ergodic on the whole set of strategies. In fact,
Pavlov becomes a secondary strategy in so far as trajectories within
the recurrent set do not spend much time in it. The two most
important strategies in the recurrent set are 1000, the modest
WSLS one, and AllD; interestingly, 1000 becomes dominant–in
the sense that the population spends more time using it–as T
increases and S decreases. It is worth noting that this modest
WSLS strategy can be identified with GRIM, the strategy that
cooperates until the partner defects, and then turns to defection
forever. On the other hand, the fact that nearly all strategies
appear in the equilibria has important implications: it means that
almost every strategy can invade and be invaded by some of the
others. This is clearly seen in Fig. 3, where we represent the
invasion subgraphs of the recurrent sets of the four games in this
region. Focusing as an example in the ({0:5,2:0) game, that
corresponds to Axelrod’s tournaments [12], we confirm that there
is not a unique dominant strategy and, in addition, we see that the
evolution of the system is quite complicated. Note in particular
that transitions between AllD and GRIM are almost never direct,
but rather they proceed through intermediate populations; thus,
0000 becomes destabilized and evolves towards 0010 or 1010 (the
famous TFT), to proceed from there to GRIM through Pavlov.
Similar cycles are repeated in the other three games, as can be
seen in Fig. 3. An interesting observation that also arises from
these plots is that as T increases and S decreases, not only GRIM
becomes more important, but in addition the structure of the
invasion graph simplifies largely, and direct transitions from AllD
to GRIM become possible, the cycle being completed through
TFT and subsequently to others to go back to GRIM. Therefore,
we see that in the large temptation region Pavlov is not the
dominant strategy anymore, and this role is now played, to
different extents, by GRIM and AllD.
The reader may be puzzled by the fact that the scenario we are
depicting for the ({0:5,2:0) game is so different from the outcome
of Axelrod’s tournaments [12]. One should bear in mind though
that our dynamics and Axelrod’s is very different. Axelrod
confronted every pair of strategies, which interacted along 200
rounds and accumulated the payoffs obtained through the
tournament. TFT was the best scoring strategy. But this is very
different from the dynamics we are exploring here, where every
new strategy attempts to invade a resident, stable population. This
difference was already noted by Nowak and Sigmund [19] in their
simulations confronting random mixtures of different strategies.
There are still two parameter regions left: the Stag Hunt
quadrant below the SzT~0 line and the portion of the
Snowdrift quadrant with SzTw2. As already noted above, these
two sets cannot be explained in terms of WSLS strategies, at least
not entirely; in addition, the structure of the equilibria is different
in the two games. For the Stag Hunt game, we always find several
absorbing states. This multi-stability is the signature of this game,
even when played one shot. The ultimate reason is the existence of
two Nash equilibria in the one-shot game, which gives players
some freedom in devising different coordinating strategies. The
relative importance of the different absorbing states–measured in
terms of the probability of reaching them–depends on the
parameter values, but in general the most relevant strategy, i.e.,
the one appearing more often as a result of the evolution, is AllC.
As we go down the quadrant, Pavlov, initially significant, loses
much of its importance and its probability as a possible
evolutionary stable population decreases with respect to GRIM–
which also plays here the role of a modest WSLS strategy. As a
Table 4. Recurrent sets found in the Stag Hunt game
quadrant.
S T
strategies in
recurrent set sm am
0 0:5 1111 1 0.60
1001 1 0.22
0001 1 0.18
{0:25 0:75 1111 1 0.40
1001 1 0.46
0001 1 0.14
{0:5 0:5 1111 1 0.55
1001 1 0.32
0001 1 0.13
{0:75 0:25 1111 1 0.64
1001 1 0.16
0001 1 0.12
0111 1 0.08
{0:25 {0:75 1111 1 0.66
1001 1 0.14
0001 1 0.06
0111 1 0.14
{0:5 {0:5 1111 1 0.66
1001 1 0.14
0001 1 0.07
0111 1 0.13
{0:75 {0:25 1111 1 0.54
1001 1 0.11
0001 1 0.07
0111 1 0.13
1000 1 0.15
{1:5 {0:5 1111 1 0.41
1001 1 0.10
0001 1 0.10
0111 1 0.08
1000 1 0.24
0110 1 0.07
{1:5 0:5 1111 1 0.17
1001 1 0.21
0001 1 0.09
1000 1 0.53
Same as Table 1 for the Stag Hunt game quadrant (Sƒ0, Tv1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035135.t004
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matter of fact, for very negative S and T close to (but below) 1,
GRIM substitutes even AllC as the most relevant strategy.
As for the part of the diagram with SzTw2, practically in all
cases we find mixed equilibria, and more often than not two
different mixed equilibria form disjoint recurrent sets. The key to
understand these results is to note that in this region, any payoff
which is a combination of S and T is higher than the highest fixed
payoff (R~1). Since an individual and her co-player have to opt
for a different action (cooperate or defect) to get S or T payoffs,
they need to anti-coordinate their actions, so they can benefit
alternatively in even or odd rounds. Hence, the best strategies are
two mixed states: 0010+0011+1011 and 0100+0101(+1101).
Indeed, an individual that plays one of the strategy from the last
group continues cooperating after obtaining S and defecting after
T . In this manner, one of the player is always obtaining S and the
other T . If one of them mistakes her action (which will eventually
occur), the combination of two strategies forces them back to the
S-T dynamics in one or two rounds. The same process takes place
for the first mixed state, but in this case both players switch actions
all the time, i.e., when one obtains S she changes to defection and
when she gets T she goes back to cooperation. It is interesting to
note that as S becomes the largest payoff, the strategy 1101
becomes more important (see upper left corner of the Snowdrift
quadrant in Fig. 1). This strategy is the modest WSLS one in the
region, and is highly cooperative as well, defecting only if needed
to anti-coordinate with the opponent. Therefore, even if the
description of the successful strategies in this region is in general
not compatible with WSLS strategies, they still play a role in their
modest version.
Fixation probabilities
As discussed in ‘Methods’, in a finite population the dynamics
eventually leads to fixation of one of the strategies–either the
resident or the invader. If the population is large, the presence of
quasi-stationary mixed states may increase the fixation time
exponentially with the size of the population. If the population is
large, fixation will never be observed in practice; however, in small
populations and with very small mutation (invasion) rates the
fixation process becomes meaningful. In order to make a complete
discussion of this problem we will address here the description of
the invasion process in terms of fixation probabilities [43]. A plus
of this analysis is that it will reveal the relevance of the mixed states
in the final outcome of the process.
We represent in Fig. 4 the results of the Markov chain
constructed out of fixations and fixation probabilities, using the
same conventions as in Fig. 1. Given two strategies, a resident one
and an invader, fixation of either one has always a nonzero
probability to occur, even though most often one of them is very
small. For the sake of simplicity fixation probabilities smaller than
10{14 has been neglected in this plot.
The first obvious difference between Figs. 1 and 4 is that all
mixed equilibria have disappeared in the latter. This is very
important for the region SzTw2 (in the Snowdrift quadrant). In
general, Fig. 4 is simpler than Fig. 1, but remarkably the main
general features remain. Thus, the stripe delimited by SzT~0
and SzT~2 shows again the smooth transition from Pavlov in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma with not so large temptations to AllC in
the Harmony game, both being the balanced WSLS strategies in
their corresponding parameter sets. In the region where we found
Figure 2. Distribution of the payoffs and the different win-stay, lose-shift strategies. Strategies are ordered according to decreasing
aspiration level [32] in the different regions of the (S,T) plane.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035135.g002
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the mixed equilibria before, the Snowdrift game with SzTw2,
we now have only three strategies: 0100, 1011 and 1101. The last
one, the modest WSLS option, is only relevant for larger S,
whereas the other two are strategies that tend to anti-coordinate
with the opponent, changing action with a probability of 50%.
Another noticeable difference is that sometimes the simulations
show a few more absorbing states than the fixation analysis (e.g.,
for S~{0:75,T~{0:25). We have checked that this is a result
of insufficient statistics in simulations. Indeed, some states appear
as absorbing because the probability that they are invaded by
other strategy is always smaller than the inverse of the number of
realizations (0:01 in our case). We have checked that by increasing
precision in simulations these absorbing states disappear and the
two scenarios approach each other. Anyway the average
probabilities of being absorbed in these fake absorbing states are
always small (v0:1) so they hardly arise as the final result of the
evolution.
Another difference between the two schemes is that the
probabilities of the absorbing nodes and recurrent sets are slightly
different in the SzTv2 region. This is not just due to insufficient
statistic but a deeper effect. As it turns out, mixed states do
influence the asymptotic probability distribution of the recurrent
sets even when they do not belong to them, because the probability
that a mixed state arises or is invaded by one or another strategy
affects in turn the probabilities of the invaded or invading
strategies. This fact is even clearer for the games with
2ƒTƒ2{S, where the mixed states are part of the recurrent sets.
All in all, we can conclude that the analysis using fixation
probabilities does not change qualitatively our main conclusions,
and only affects the existence of the mixed states, which are
Figure 3. Graphs of the recurrent set in the 2ƒTƒ2{S games. Vertices show the most representative (smw0:02) pure (red) and mixed (blue)
states. The rest of states are grouped in a single vertex (black). The size of a vertex is proportional to its corresponding value of sm. Arrows show the
transition probabilities, with widths and colors proportional to their values normalized to the minimum probability (in ascending order: green, light
blue, dark blue and grey).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035135.g003
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replaced by a few of the participants in the mixed states found in
the simulations.
Discussion
In this paper, we have carried out a thorough study of the
evolutionary successful strategies in iterated symmetric 2|2
games, focusing on quasi-deterministic memory-one strategies.
To this end, we introduced an approach that has proven very
fruitful in ecosystem assembly studies [34–36], whose basic idea is
to study the process as isolated invasions which lead from a
population composition to another one with some probability, and
to build a Markov chain out of these invasion transitions. We have
implemented two versions of the procedure, one involving an
individual based model, that allows to identify mixed equilibria
with extremely long absorbing times–hence relevant to actual
observations–and another more standard one based on fixation
probabilities, that leads to the truly asymptotic results. The
agreement between both approaches is very good and provides a
test of our findings as well as a check on the validity range of the
simulation approach. We have also introduced an accelerated
version of the dynamics so that the simulations can be performed
in an affordable computing time. This acceleration is quite general
and valid for many other birth-death processes.
The main picture that arises from our study highlights the
importance of WSLS strategies, as first found in [31]. Our results
confirm that, generally speaking, balanced WSLS (those aspiring
to intermediate payoffs) strategies are the successful ones in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma and in the Harmony game. On a larger scale,
some type of WSLS strategy, be it balanced or modest (aspiring to
the second lowest payoff) is always relevant to understand the
equilibrium structure of the games. Thus, GRIM, a modest WSLS
strategy, is important in the Prisoner’s Dilemma for large
temptations, whereas 1101 appears with large probability in the
Snowdrift game. As for the structure of the selected populations,
we have found that when SzTv2, absorbing states consisting of
only one strategy appear, whereas above that line and to the right
of T~2 both, complex recurrent states or mixed states, result from
the evolution of the population. The latter is the region where the
risk in cooperating (S) and the temptation to defect (T ) are very
large, and their influence on the evolution of the population is
considerably larger than that of the other two payoffs. Therefore, it
pays to have a strategy focusing in obtaining these two payoffs,
which leads to anti-coordination in the Snowdrift game and to
invadability of almost any strategy in the Prisoner’s Dilemma for
large temptations, when anti-coordinating is very detrimental for
the player choosing the lower payoff action. For this last case, we
have been able to build the detailed invasion graphs and to
completely characterize how strategies replace each other, the
complexity of the recurrent state decreasing with increasing
absolute values of S and T .
A final remark is in order concerning the lessons from our study.
We have found that ambitious WSLS strategies are never
successful for any of the games we have studied. This is likely to
occur because such strategies need a population to exploit, as the
players using them need to benefit from their opponent’s good will
in order to obtain the largest payoff. In so doing, they lead the
exploited strategies to extinction, and subsequently cause their
own disappearance as they become invadable by more modest
WSLS strategists, that fare well against each other. On the other
hand, our results point out to the importance of identifying the
kind of social dilemma one is involved in and, in particular, to
realize that one is in a Snowdrift type of situation, because in this
case and unless SzTv2, a WSLS approach will not succeed.
The challenge for the players is then to try to take turns in
choosing the most beneficial actions and be so generous as to avoid
insisting on being always the player with the largest payoff. Such
an ambitious version of anti-coordination is indeed possible for
Figure 4. Composition of the recurrent sets for each studied game. The plot is the same as Figure 1, but measuring the transition
probabilities as probabilities of absorption.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035135.g004
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some time when there is coexistence in the population of exploiter
and exploited individuals, but in the end only alternating anti-
coordination can prevail. Once again, extreme ambition does not
pay, a conclusion that is confirmed in the large temptation regime
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma by noticing the very important role
played by GRIM in keeping AllD at bay, preventing it from
becoming fixed in the population. Therefore, we see that modest
ambitions regarding the payoffs are the rule of thumb to deal
successfully with these 2|2 social dilemmas.
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